Abstract. We define a new strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (significantly more likely than a neutral mutant) essentially all known memory-one strategies for the prisoner's dilemma and other population games, including ALLC (always cooperate), ALLD (always defect), tit-for-tat (TFT) [7] , win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) [11] , and zero determinant (ZD) strategies, including extortionate and generous strategies. We will refer to a player using this strategy as an information player and the specific implementation as IP 0 . Such players use the history of play to identify opponent's strategies and respond accordingly, and naturally learn to cooperate with each other.
Introduction
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) [16] has a long history of study in evolutionary game theory [10] [12] and finite populations and is usually defined by a game matrix ( R S T P ) with T > R > P > S and often 2R > T + S. A special case known as the donation game is given by T = b, R = b − c, P = 0, S = −c, with 0 < c < b. The discovery of zero determinant strategies by Press and Dyson [14] has invigorated the study of the prisoner's dilemma, including the evolutionary stability of these strategies in population games and their relationship to and impact on the evolution of cooperation [10] [18] [6] [5] [2] [1] [17] . In a tournament emulating the influential contest conducted by Axelrod [3] , Stewart and Plotkin show that some zero determinant (ZD) strategies are very successful; Adami and Hintze [1] have shown that ZD strategies are evolutionarily unstable in general, but can be effective if opponents can be identified and play can depend on the opponent's type (including versus itself). In particular, how a strategy fares against itself becomes crucial in population games.
Many strategies for the prisoner's dilemma have been studied in a huge array of contexts, and it is often found that simpler strategies can beat more complex strategies (e.g. TFT won early repeated prisoner's dilemma tournaments [3] ). It has long been common to formulate PD strategies as first-order Markov processes, i.e. whose next move depends only on the last game outcome. This can be described by a vector of four probabilities denoting the probability that the player will select to cooperate (C) based on the previous round of play: (P r(C|CC), P r(C|CD), P r(C|DC), P r(C|DD)); we will refer to this as a strategy vector. Press and Dyson suggested that such first-order Markov strategies, called memoryone strategies, can dominate more complex strategies; specifically, that using higher-order history does not help versus a ZD (first-order Markov) strategy [14] . Stewart and Plotkin * corresponding author, email: leec@chem.ucla.edu have also argued that a generous ZD strategy can be robust against any invading strategy (i.e. no invader can achieve better than neutral fixation probability) [18] under a set of assumptions including weak selection. In population games, Adami and Hintze have indicated that tag information identifying which players are of the opposing type can significantly increase evolutionary success [1] . They also suggested that it is possible to recognize an opponent's strategy from the history of play. Can information from past history -ignored by a first-order Markov strategy -improve evolutionary success?
1.1. Information Players. We refer to a player that uses such information (history or some sort of tag indicating strategy) as an information player (IP). Formally, whereas a first-order Markov player's next move is conditionally independent of past history given the current game outcome (zero mutual information), an information player's next move depends on past history (shares non-zero mutual information given the current game outcome). Specifically, we investigate whether machine learning can yield useful information from past history, both to identify opponents and to infer their likely behavior.
Our approach recapitulates long-standing principles, for example as summarized by Sun Tzu's The Art of War :
The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but few calculations beforehand.
Know your enemy and know yourself, find naught in fear for 100 battles.
...what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.
One defends when his strength is inadequate, he attacks when it is abundant.
-Sun Tzu, The Art of War
In particular, we explicitly define a strategy that utilizes the history of play to determine the strategies of other players (assuming no strategy identifying tag is supplied), and uses these determinations to optimize its subsequent moves. We call this specific implementation of an information player IP 0 , which embodies the principles above as follows:
• Know your enemy. Rather than seeking to maximize its score, IP 0 initially seeks to maximize its information about another player's strategy vector. For the first 10 rounds vs. a specific player, IP 0 selects its plays, either cooperate (C) or defect (D), solely to maximize its information yield about the other player's strategy vector probabilities. We refer to this as the information gain phase. The four probabilities are estimated from these rounds of play and are continually refined in subsequent rounds.
• Know yourself. Each IP 0 individual attempts to identify whether each other other player is also IP 0 , based purely on whether it appears to "play like me" (choose the same moves an IP 0 would have chosen). In particular, the information gain phase produces a unique pattern of play, that can be quickly recognized (within 3 -10 moves), even in the presence of random noise (randomly flipped moves). Note however that each IP 0 player acts completely independently; different IP 0 in a population share no information and do not communicate.
• Attack the enemy's strategy. In subsequent rounds, each IP 0 seeks to maximize its own average score (and by extension that of all IPs in the population) vs. that of the opposing player type. Specifically, it always seeks to cooperate with other IP 0 individuals; versus the opposing type, it chooses the optimal strategy vector based on its estimate of the opposing type's strategy vector. As rounds proceed, each IP 0 continues to update its estimate of opponents probabilities, and adjusts its play as needed to maximize its average score difference.
• One defends... one attacks... We will see that IP 0 naturally switches effective strategy depending on the proportion of IP 0 in the population, and the opponent strategy. Commonly, IP 0 initially cooperates with the opposing type, when IP 0 is in the minority, and later defects against the opposing type, when IP 0 is in the majority. In this paper we test our approach on a variety of traditionally successful strategies and ZD strategies, but our results are not limited to such opponents, nor for that matter to the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We also allow for errors in play, described by an ambient noise parameter ǫ since this provides a greater variety of strategic interactions between many classical players such as TFT and WSLS.
1.2. ZD strategies. Stewart and Plotkin have shown that for weak selection the class of generous zero determinant strategies is evolutionarily robust in the space of memory-one players and that these robust ZD strategies can invade other (extortionate) zero determinant strategies [18] . We will refer to these robust strategies as "ZDR" throughout this paper, and will use as one key example the ZDR (χ = 1 2 ) case, which represents the best of the class that Stewart and Plotkin designate as "Good and robust" [18] . We will refer to extortionate ZD strategies as "ZD χ "; see Methods for details.
Results

2.1.
One defends when his strength is inadequate, he attacks when it is abundant. The long run evolutionary fitness of a player of type I is determined by its mean stationary score relative to that of players of the opposing group G, specifically
where m is the number of players of type I in the population; N −m is the number of players of type G; S II , S IG , S GI , S GG are the average scores of players of type I with each other vs. with a player of the opposing group, and the opposing group player's average scores with a player of type I vs. with another group player. An optimal strategy for player I is simply one that maximizes S I − S G . Note that this is strongly dependent on the population fraction f = m/N; for small f (m ≪ N), S I − S G is dominated by the S IG , S GG terms; whereas for large f it is dominated by the S II , S GI terms. Note that the two-player game considered by Press & Dyson is a subcase of this spectrum; specifically, the only case (N = 2) where there is only one possible value of m (m = 1) and S I − S G reduces to the trivial form S I − S G = S IG − S GI . Note carefully that IP 0 attempts to maximize the stationary score difference, in simulation we use the actual values from the prisoner's dilemma matrix, and do not assume that the payoffs are the stationary payoffs (in contrast to e.g. [19] ). Figures 1 and 2 show S I − S G as a function of population fraction f , for a variety of established strategies, computed from their long-term (stationary) scores [14] . Several basic conclusions emerge from these plots. First, no one strategy is optimal against all opponents: for example, at low population fractions, ZDR is optimal against WSLS, whereas ALLC is optimal against ZD χ . Second, even against a single opponent, typically no one strategy is optimal at all population fractions. For example, against WSLS, ZDR scores better than ALLD at low population fractions, but worse than ALLD at high population fractions. Third, even at a single given point on such a score plot, it is commonly not optimal for players of type I to play the same strategy vector with each other as with the opposing players of type G. For example, at high population fractions, playing ALLD vs. the opponent (ensuring S GI ≤ P ) while playing ALLC with each other (yielding S II = R) maximizes S I − S G → R − P . Hintze and Adami have posited a theoretical strategy, Conditional Defector (ConDef) for achieving this: assuming that it is given the correct tag for the type of each player, ConDef cooperates with other ConDef players and defects vs. players of the opposing type [1] . (They also defined a tag-based ZD player ZD t that cooperates with other ZD t players and plays a ZD strategy against the opposing type). Fourth, it is striking that even traditionally successful strategies such as WSLS and ZDR are vulnerable to invasion, because at low population fractions an invader can achieve parity (neutral selection) vs. these strategies, while at high population fraction it can gain a crushing advantage over them (by switching to what is essentially ConDef).
Taken together, these results suggest that information gleaned from the history of previous game outcomes can yield several basic advantages for choosing moves in the subsequent rounds: player I can infer which individual players are "like it" (i.e. also of type I) vs. "enemy" (i.e. of type G; we refer to this as identification); player I can estimate player G's strategy vector, enabling it to choose the optimal counter-strategy; player I can estimate what fraction of the population consists of players of type G. All of these are crucial for maximizing S I − S G .
Know Your Enemy and Know Thyself.
That identification is useful highlights a crucial question: in the absence of strategy-indicating tags, can an information player determine the identity of other players (I vs. G) rapidly and accurately, purely from the past history of how they played against it in previous games? IP 0 begins its play versus any other player with an information gain phase (infogain, see Methods). This phase seeks to collect maximal information about the other's strategy vector, and at the same time estimates the likelihood that the other is also an IP0 player; specifically whether it is also playing by the infogain rule. Thus the infogain phase achieves self-recognition by a most basic principle, "does the opponent play similarly?" (i.e. choose the same moves that IP 0 ).
This approach can rapidly discriminate non-IP 0 players. In the absence of random noise (move errors), it is trivial: the very first move that doesn't match the expected infogain move exposes the opponent to be not IP 0 , and this typically occurs within the first 3 moves. To make this more challenging, we assessed the effect of random noise, by randomly flipping each player's move with probability ǫ. Then IP 0 must assess observed mismatches probabilistically, e.g. by computing the probability that the observed mismatches could have arisen from another IP 0 player due solely to random noise (see Methods). This can achieve good discrimination, at the cost of a few extra rounds. Figure 3A shows Receiver-Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves for discrimination of non-IP 0 players (vertical axis, True Positives) vs. IP0 players (horizontal axis, False Positives) after 10 rounds of play under 5% noise. Corner strategies such as ALLC and ALLD were identified perfectly (i.e. 100% TP at 0% FP), while the most difficult case (ZDR) was identified with 98% accuracy at a false positive rate of only 10%. Concretely, for N = 100 players, a single IP 0 player invading a resident ZDR population could confidently identify 97 of the 99 ZDR players, while having a 90% probability of recognizing any new IP 0 player within just 10 rounds of play. To summarize the speed of this process and its sensitivity to noise, we computed a standard measure of discrimination accuracy (AUC, Area Under the Curve, the integral of the ROC curve) for the hardest case (ZDR), and plotted it as a function of number of infogain rounds and for different levels of noise ( Figure 3B ). At zero noise, perfect discrimination (AUC=1) was achieved after just 3 rounds; with up to 10% noise, AUC accuracies of 87-98% were attained after just 3 rounds. Even at 10% noise, AUC accuracy of greater than 97% was attained after 10 rounds. (Table 1) . Starting with m = 1 player of one type invading N −1 players of a second type, we performed simulations as described in Stewart and Plotkin, i.e. with the exponential imitation dynamic (and β = 1), donation game matrix, and N = 100 population size [18] (see Methods). In each round of play, every individual plays every other individual, moves are randomly flipped with probability ǫ = 0.05, and fitness is computed as total payout versus all other players. Note that no tag (type) information was supplied about any player. Instead, each player was assigned a unique integer ID value, which other players could use to track their history of play vs. that specific player, and all players were notified of the ID of any player replaced by the imitation dynamic (but again given no information about the type of the new player). Table 1 lists the fixation odds ratio of each strategy versus each other strategy, determined empirically via simulation (specifically, it gives the ratio ρ/ρ neutral , where ρ is the observed fixation probability, and ρ neutral = 1/N is the fixation probability expected under neutral selection; hence a table value of 1.0 indicates neutral selection). In no case was IP 0 successfully invaded by any other strategy. By contrast, IP 0 is able to invade all other strategies, with a fixation probability greater than a neutral mutant (ρ > ρ neutral ), and in all cases is either the best or second best opponent (i.e. largest or second largest value in each column). In the language of the Moran process, IP 0 has higher relative fitness versus all other strategies, and as a resident strategy is evolutionarily robust (defined as ρ ≤ ρ neutral for all possible invaders [13] ) tested. Qualitatively similar results hold for other population sizes N ≈ 30 or greater. We also simulated with a Moran selection rule, where each round one player is selected to reproduce proportionally to fitness and one player is selected to be replaced uniformly at random [9] [12] . Results were similar. Also, results for simulations using the standard prisoner's dilemma score matrix (as in [14] , instead of the donation game matrix) for ALLD and p < 10 −26 otherwise.
are qualitatively similar. In principle, IP 0 should excel in any asymmetric game with similar updating rules (it is not designed specifically for a particular game or updating rule). These values reveal much about how IP 0 competes against other players. IP 0 is nearly as effective against ALLC as ALLD is, and quickly learns to exploit ALLC, but has a slightly smaller fixation probability because of the information gaining stage. IP 0 also fares well against ALLD, behaving much like TFT in that it cooperates with other (identified) IP 0 individuals and defects against ALLD. Outcomes versus ALLD are sensitive to initial population proportion. An invading subpopulation of 10 IP 0 has an empirically computed fixation probability of ρ ≈ 0.5 (versus a neutral fixation probability of ρ = 0.10).
Versus TFT, IP 0 does not fall prey to the mismatches in due to errors that TFT is prone to [12] , but may suffer versus TFT in the information gaining period (and so does not fare quite as well as ALLC, but has a higher chance to invade than all other players). Among all strategies in our simulations, IP 0 is the only strategy to have a fixation probability greater than a neutral mutant (ρ neutral = 1/N) versus all other strategies, and the only strategy resistant to invasion by all other strategies.
In general, the ability of IP 0 to invade other strategies appears to correlate with its fitness difference vs. those strategies at low population fractions (i.e. m ≈ 1, see Figs. 1 -2) . For those where IP 0 can immediately achieve a strongly positive stationary score difference (e.g. vs. ALLC, TFT, ZDR, ZD χ ), it can invade with high fixation probabilities. For those where IP 0 is confined to neutral score for low values of m (e.g. vs. ALLD, WSLS), its fixation probabilities are lower.
Smaller values of ǫ make TFT more challenging to infiltrate, however at ǫ = 0.01 the fixation probability of an IP 0 mutant is still 8 times the neutral probability. This dependence is due to the relatively large number of rounds needed for TFT to reach its stationary distribution versus some other strategies, and this prolongs the time needed to invade an ambient population of TFT players. IP 0 is apparently uninvadable by TFT at ǫ = 0.01 and N = 100, but was invaded once in 10017 simulations for N = 40.
2.4. Robust Zero Determinant Strategies. Stewart and Plotkin have outlined a series of assumptions under which ZDR strategies are robust to all other IPD strategies [18] . One implicit assumption in this argument is that players' type cannot be identified, either by a tag as described by Adami and Hintze [1] or by statistical inference from the history of play as performed by IP 0 . As shown in Fig. 2C , ZDR strategies are vulnerable to invasion by such information players, because the ZDR can at best guarantee neutral selection i.e. (S I − S G = 0) vs. the IP invader at low population fractions (m ≈ 1), whereas when the IP invader is in the majority it can gain a strong selective advantage (S I − S G ≫ 0). In simulations, we found that a tag-based IP (ConSwitch) invades ZDR at much higher than neutral fixation probability (ρ/ρ neutral ≈ 1.6, see Fig. 4 ), and that IP 0 achieved better than neutral invasion success against ZDR for χ ≥ 0.8 even at zero noise (ǫ = 0). We wish to emphasize that our IP 0 implementation clearly falls far short of the theoretical IP performance limit as indicated by ConSwitch. This mirrors what we saw at low population fractions in Fig. 2B , where IP 0 falls short of the perfect (neutral) score that ConSwitch attains vs ZDR. This shortfall is due to the "cost" of the infogain phase in the current IP implementation, which indicates a clear direction for improvement of our IP implementation.
A second factor that renders ZDR easily prone to invasion by IP 0 is the effect of noise. Even low levels of noise (e.g. ǫ = 0.01) enabled IP 0 to invade ZDR at better than neutral fixation probability at all values of χ (Fig. 4) . In general, noise appears to degrade the performance of Markov players such as ZDR even more than it degrades the performance of IP 0 . Specifically, noise reduces ZDR's ability to cooperate with itself (i.e. the fraction of ZDR-ZDR game outcomes that are CC), and hence its stationary score (see Fig. 4 ), more than it reduces IP 0 's ability to cooperate with itself (because its self-recognition algorithm is robust to noise, and its self-strategy -ALLC -is less affected by noise than ZDR is).
Discussion
For zero noise, weak selection, no history, and stationary payouts, the robustness results of Stewart and Plotkin are not contradicted by our empirical results (likewise for the strong selection results in [20] ). Our results, however, indicated that with tagging of player strategies, robust zero determinant strategies can be invaded for non-weak selection and no noise. This should not be surprising from Figures 1 and 2 . ZDR is not able to generally able invade IP 0 nor the variety of strategies that IP 0 is able to invade. For instance, ZDR is neutral versus e.g. ALLC (with ǫ = 0), whereas IP 0 can invade ALLC easily at the same level of noise. Note that whereas IP 0 is always able to invade ZDR strategies, even at zero noise, neither ZDR strategies nor any of the other strategies we've tested is ever able to invade IP 0 .
Fixation probabilities for zero-determinant strategies were studied by Stewart and Plotkin [19] in the case of weak selection. Our results indicate IP 0 is robust to invasion against all the opponents in Table 1 . That this generally holds is simply a consequence of the fact that IP 0 specifically chooses to maximize the stationary score difference with its opponents while Figure 4 . Invasion success of IP versus ZD strategies (log-scale, fixation probability of an IP0 invader, normalized so 1.0 = neutral selection) for different levels of noise ǫ. The top plot is extortionate (κ = 0 while the lower three plots have κ = B − C so the ZD strategies are cooperative [19] . As the value of χ increases, the fixation probability of IP increases. As the amount of noise decreases, the fixation of our implementation of IP approaches the neutral fixation. With no noise, an IP player can empirically invade ZDR at twice the neutral probability (20 out of 1000 simulations with the information phase replaced with tags).
obtaining the cooperative payout when playing itself. Therefore, once the information gain phase is over, IP 0 will fixate at least as well as a neutral mutant strategy, and typically much more often. For IP 0 to be invaded or resisted better than a neutral mutant, the opponent strategy must somehow exploit the manner in which IP attempts to gain information (perhaps by mimicing IP 0 to be misidentified as another IP 0 player), or the information gain phase must be too costly (for instance in a very small population).
We have shown that information strategies utilizing the history of play can be highly effective infiltrators and are very robust against invasion in population games. IP 0 is able to invade essentially any memory-one strategy for a reasonably large population (close to neutral in the worst cases, vastly dominant in others), with greater success under greater ambient error probabilities (at least in the range we tested, 0ǫ0.1). We conjecture that for sufficiently large populations IP 0 is robust to invasion against all memory-one strategies, and also that IP 0 is neutral or better as an invader of memory-one strategies (with exceptions occurring mainly for small ambient noise and/or weak selection).
While we have discussed our results in the context of the prisoner's dilemma, IP 0 is effective in principle in all population games without significant modification. For any game matrix, IP 0 will still identify other players' strategies and maximize the difference in stationary payout. Information players should fare well in a variety of other contexts, including asymmetric games and population games on graphs.
We have not attempted to optimize the relative length of the IP 0 information gain phase, and it is clear in some contexts that finer-tuned play is possible, particularly against generous ZD strategies for the donation game. In particular, very small populations may require a more refined information gain phase. We have also not attempted to optimize against other "theory of mind" players that may be able to play effectively against our implementation of an information player. The implementation does attempt to recognize players that are able to change their strategies and respond accordingly, and similar countermeasures could be employed. At some point, for the prisoner's dilemma, play between two players degenerates into an ultimatum game [14] , and uncooperative and/or manipulative players could simply be systematically defected against.
3.1. History of Play. In [19] , Stewart and Plotkin argue that (under weak selection, in the absence of ambient noise, and using stationary score as fitness) that one need only consider memory-one strategies in population games to determine evolutionary robustness (extending a similar idea of Press and Dyson for two-player games). Like Adami and Hintze, we find that the history of play allows for highly effective non-memory-one strategies. The assumption that each player has a unique identifier is operationally equivalent to providing in each pairing the history of play of the pair to each player before they select their move, allowing for a personalized response, e.g. the inference of strategy identifying tags. Note carefully that we are not assuming that the history of interactions with other (third-party) players is available to each pair, just the history of play of the specified pairing. Our results show that it is not generally sufficient to only consider memory-one players in population games.
Another important distinction of IP 0 is that the individual information players cannot be aggregated as all having the same stationary score with each other. Indeed, the IP 0 subpopulation is more like a quasispecies with several closely related variants, with each information player potentially identifying a different subpopulation of information players players and having inferred slightly different conditional probability vectors for non-IP 0 strategies (the information players share no information explicitly). Accordingly, we computed fixation probabilities empirically from large numbers of simulation and cannot rely on the typical analytic formulas for two-type population games (death-birth processes). For larger populations, the deviation from the theoretical values (from the stationary payouts) should be small, since IP 0 can quickly approach stationary payoffs.
In principle, information strategies could be generalized to detect memory-m players using m-rounds of history to form their strategies, such as Tit-for-Two-Tats. This may require a longer information gaining stage, but it is possible to first attempt a memory-one model and use information metrics to determine if an alternate model is required [8] . We leave this topic, and the issue of effective counter-strategies to IP 0 and other information players, for future work.
MaRS.
After circulating an initial draft of this manuscript, the authors were made aware by Christian Hilbe of a strategy known as MaRS (mimicry and relative similarity), created by Fischer et al [4] . Like IP 0 , an individual playing the MaRS strategy is an information player and uses a unique identifier for each opponent along with the history of play to formulate a counter-strategy, but unlike IP 0 uses principles of mimicry and imitation to emulate aspects of the classical strategies such as TFT and WSLS. This leads to the emergence of cooperation by pushing non-cooperative opponents toward extinction.
We attempted an implementation of MaRS, which we call MaRS * to indicate potential differences from the implementation in [4] , and simulated population games versus IP 0 and the other strategies in Table 1 . With no noise, MaRS * was able to invade TFT (59x neutral), ZD χ (35x), ZDR (1.5x) and is approx. neutral versus ALLC and WSLS; IP 0 invades TFT at 54x, ZD χ at 71x, ALLC at 61x, and ALLD at 7x. Both MaRS * and IP 0 are robust to invasion by the tested strategies above, however one additional test strategy GTFT (generous tit-for-tat) was able to invade MaRS * with a greater than neutral probability (≈ 600 out of 10000, 6-fold greater than neutral). Interestingly MaRS * is able to invade GTFT at about twice the netural probability, while IP 0 is unable to invade (0.8x) or be invaded by GTFT in the same context. This indicates that MaRS * is qualitatively more similar to GTFT than IP 0 .
At the 5% noise level, MaRS * is able to invade ALLC at 46x and ZD χ at 3x, and is invaded by TFT (3x neutral) and ZDR (18x netural). Compare to Table 1 where IP 0 is robust to invasion and an effective invader of all the test strategies. Neither MaRS * nor IP 0 is able to invade the other at 0% or 5% noise.
Ostensibly the performance of MaRS * and IP 0 are somewhat similar for the prisoner's dilemma in the absence of noise, which can be understood by the work of Press and Dyson [14] . Maximizing the long run (stationary) payoffs of the prisoner's dilemma often necessitates some degree of coordination for various pairs of opponents by the nature of the payoffs of the game. While MaRS * cooperates with opponents that exhibit a similar history of play by design, IP 0 only cooperates if doing so rewards cooperation stationarily, and is not tied in principle to either the prisoner's dilemma or strategic scenarios that benefit from mimicry or other coordinated modes of play. For the prisoner's dilemma, the principles underlying IP 0 sometimes align with those of MaRS * , which indicates that IP 0 too induces the emergence of cooperation. But the intentionality is different, since IP 0 cares not about cooperation, only in maximizing relative stationary output, recapitulating the principle of natural selection.
Nevertheless, it is clear that both MaRS * and IP 0 are interesting strategies that go beyond memory-one dynamics, and that adjustments to the operating rules of both (such as considerations for noise in the MaRS * decision rules and optimization of the infogain phase of IP 0 ) may result in a further convergence of the outcomes for the two strategies for the prisoner's dilemma in the contexts tested here. Both MaRS * and IP 0 are likely to exhibit interesting behaviors for asymmetric and higher-dimensional games as the space of strategies beyond memory-one strategies is explored.
Materials and Methods
4.1.
Simulations. Evolutionary simulations were performed using either the Moran process or the imitation dynamic with selection strength σ = 1 as in [18] . Unless otherwise stated, all simulations were performed with a total population size of N = 100 starting with a single player of the invading type and run until fixation of either the resident or invading type, and the donation game score matrix (2, -1, 3, 0) as in [18] .
In most cases, N sim = 10, 000 independent simulations were run for each (invader, resident) pair, and p-values for the observed number of successful invasions k were computed under a null hypothesis H 0 assuming a neutral rate of fixation θ = 1/N:
Following [14] and [18] , we focus on memory-1 strategies with probability vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) = (P r(C|CC), P r(C|CD), P r(C|DC), P r(C|DD)).
Unless otherwise specified in the text, we used the standard probability vector specified in [18] for ZDR (with κ = 2, χ = , φ = 0.1).
4.2.
Information Player Implementation. We implemented a basic information player strategy, called IP 0 , with the following components: (1) an infogain phase during which an IP 0 player chooses its moves to maximize its information yield about a new player, both to assess whether it is another IP 0 (self vs. non-self), and in the latter case to estimate its strategy vector; (2) a groupmax phase during which the IP seeks to maximize its score relative to the opponent group, by either cooperating (if the other player is also using ip) or using its current optimal strategy versus the group (if the other player is not an IP). Note that when multiple IP 0 players are present in a population, they operate completely independently; they do not share information or communicate.
4.3. Basic definitions. IP 0 records the outcomes of its games vs. a given player in terms of (n AB , m AB ) pairs, where A is a possible move (C or D) by itself, B is a possible move by the other player (C or D), n AB is the total number of times game outcome AB has occurred with this player, and m AB is the number of those cases where the other player's next move was C. Treating each such case as a binomial event with probability p AB = θ (probability of cooperating given game outcome AB), the posterior distribution is p(θ|n AB , m AB ) = β(m AB + 1, n AB − m AB + 1) (i.e. the Beta distribution assuming a uniform prior p(θ) = 1), the maximum likelihood estimator isθ = m AB /n AB , and the posterior expectation value is θ = E(θ|n AB , m AB ) = (m AB + 1)/(n AB + 2). We use the symbol p = (θ CC , θ CD , θ DC , θ DD ) to refer to such an infered probability vector.
4.4.
Infogain phase. For the first 10 rounds of its play with another player, IP 0 chooses its moves to seek game outcomes AB about which it has the least information (smallest number of counts n AB ). Specifically, if the current game outcome was ab, then it chooses the move A that minimizes the expectation value of n AB : 4.5. Groupmax phase. During this phase, IP 0 seeks to maximize its average relative score vs. the opposing group G (equation 1). Each IP 0 seeks to maximize S II (average score versus other IP 0 players by cooperating with any player it believes to be an IP. With all other players, it applies its current groupmax probability vector p groupmax chosen to maximize the difference between the second (S IG ) and third (S GI ) terms above (see below for details).
4.6. Tag inference. After each game, IP 0 computes the likelihood odds ratio for the observed move B of the other player assuming either that it is also an IP 0 , or that is a member of the opponent group (GP). This is used to update the total log-odds ratio for that player:
where L is the current log-odds ratio, L ′ is the new log-odds ratio, and ǫ is the error rate (frequency at which a player's moves are flipped).
During infogain phase, the move expected from an IP 0 player is predicted by the infogain model. During groupmax phase, it is predicted by a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [15] consisting of just two states: ALLC ("the other IP 0 recognizes me as an IP 0 , and hence cooperates with me"); and p groupmax ("the other IP 0 believes I am not IP 0 , and hence applies p groupmax against me"). The HMM permits a transition between either of these states with 1% probability per round. At the beginning of groupmax phase, the prior probability of the ALLC state is simply set to the current posterior probability that the other player will classify me as an IP, specifically p(ALLC) = 1/(e −L + 1), where L is the log-odds ratio the other player would compute from my moves.
The conditional probability p(B|GP) is computed according to p, the current inferred strategy of the opponent. If IP 0 has not yet confidently identified any players as GP (see below for details), then this p is derived solely from the IP player's game outcomes with this specific player. Otherwise, p is computed from game outcomes vs. all GP players that it has confidently identified. This assumes that all non-IP 0 opponents use the same strategy and could be relaxed for games with more than two types.
During infogain phase, an IP 0 player classifies another player as confidently GP, based on the p-value of its history of moves under the null hypothesis that it is an IP 0 playing infogain moves:
where n is the number of games it has played vs. that player, e is the number of observed mismatches vs. the expected infogain move (during those games), E is the associated random variable, and ǫ is the error rate. We used α = 0.01, for at most one expected false positive (in a population of at most 100 IP 0 ). During groupmax phase, an IP player classifies each player according to its current log-odds ratio: as an IP 0 if L > 0, otherwise as a GP. Finally, it estimates the total number of IPs currently in the population from its posterior expectation value:
where L i is its log-odds ratio for the hypothesis that player i is IP 0 vs. is a GP (the one additional count is for the IP 0 player itself). When the IP detects birth of a new player, it initializes the new player's prior log-odds ratio to L = log m N . When it detects the death of a player, if it was confidently a GP (L < log α), that player's outcome counts (n AB , m AB ) are saved for inclusion in future computations of the GP strategy vector p.
Groupmax strategy optimization.
If an IP 0 is in groupmax phase with at least one player, it computes an optimal strategy to use against the opposing group, based on its estimate of the total number of IP 0 (m) and its estimate of the opponent group's strategy vector (p). It does this based on seeking the strategy p groupmax that maximizes the interaction terms of the relative score: (2) p groupmax = arg max
where S(p, q) is the theoretical long-term score for strategy vector p when playing against strategy vector q. We compute S(p, q) as previously described by [14] . Briefly, a game between any two players is a Markov chain with states as pairs of plays in each round {CC, CD, DC, DD}. The chain has a unique stationary distribution s, and the mean of any four-vector f = (f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 ) with the stationary distribution for two players p and q is given by the Press and Dyson determinant [14] (3) D(p, q, f ) = det when f gives the scores that player p would receive for outcomes (CC, CD, DC, DD) respectively. Using this expression, IP 0 simply searches the 4-dimensional strategy vector space by gradient descent for the p that maximizes the relative score vs. the opponent strategy p. Our implementation of IP 0 and the simulation code used for this manuscript is available at https://github.com/cjlee112/latude.
